In a generalized tournament, players may have an arbitrary number of matches against each other and the outcome of games is measured cardinally with a lower and upper bound. We apply an axiomatic approach for the problem of ranking the competitors. Self-consistency demands assigning the same rank for players with equivalent results, while a player should be ranked strictly higher if it has shown an obviously better performance than another. Order preservation says that if two players have the same pairwise ranking in two tournaments where the same players have played the same number of matches, then this should be their pairwise ranking in the aggregated tournament. It is revealed that these two properties cannot be satisfied simultaneously, consequently, order preservation cannot be expected to hold on this universal domain.
Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of tournament ranking when players may have played an arbitrary number of matches against each other, from an axiomatic point of view. For instance, the matches among top tennis players (Bozóki et al., 2016) lead to a set of similar data: Andre Agassi has played 14 matches with Boris Becker, but he has never played against Björn Borg. To be more specific, we show the incompatibility of some natural properties. Impossibility theorems are well-known in the classical theory of social choice (Arrow, 1950; Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) , but our setting has a crucial difference: the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide, therefore the transitive effects of 'voting' should be considered (Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008) . We also allow for cardinal and incomplete preferences as well as ties in the ranking derived.
Several characterizations of ranking methods have been suggested in the literature by providing a set of properties such that thy uniquely determine a given method (Rubinstein, 1980; Bouyssou, 1992; Bouyssou and Perny, 1992; Gilles, 2003, 2009; Volij, 2005, 2006; Kitti, 2016) . There are some excellent axiomatic analyses, too (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998; González-Díaz et al., 2014) .
However, apart from Csató (2017b), we know only one work discussing impossibility results for ranking the nodes of a directed graph (Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008) , a domain covered by our concept of generalized tournament. We think these theorems are indispensable for a clear understanding of the axiomatic framework. For example, González-Díaz et al. (2014) has found that most ranking methods violate an axiom called order preservation, but it can be implied by some, yet buried, unfavourable consequences of this property, or by the existence of some undiscovered procedures.
It is especially a relevant issue due to the increasing popularity of sport rankings (Langville and Meyer, 2012) . In a sense, this is not an entirely new phenomenon, since sport tournaments have motivated some classical works of social choice and voting theory (Landau, 1895; Zermelo, 1929; Wei, 1952) . For instance, the ranking of tennis players has been addressed from at least three perspectives, with the use of methods from multicriteria decision-making (Bozóki et al., 2016) , network analysis (Radicchi, 2011) , or statistics McHale, 2014, 2017) , thus it is clear that the axiomatic approach can be fruitful in the choice of an appropriate sport ranking method. This issue has also been discussed by some recent works (Berker, 2014; Pauly, 2014; Csató, 2017a,c; Dagaev and Sonin, 2017; Vaziri et al., 2017; Vong, 2017) , but there is a great scope for future research.
For this purpose, we will place two properties from the social choice literature in the centre of the discussion. Self-consistency (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1997) requires assigning the same rank for players with equivalent results, furthermore, a player should be ranked strictly higher if it has shown an obviously better performance than another.
Order preservation
1 (González-Díaz et al., 2014) excludes the possibility of rank reversal by demanding the preservation of players' pairwise ranking when two tournaments, where the same players have played the same number of matches, are aggregated. In other words, it is not allowed that player A is judged better both in the first and second half of the season than player B, but ranked lower on the basis of the whole season.
Our main result proves the incompatibility of self-consistency and order preservation. This finding gives a theoretical foundation for the observation of González-Díaz et al. (2014) that most ranking methods do not satisfy order preservation. Another important message of the paper is that prospective users cannot avoid to take similar impossibilities into account, and justify the choice between the properties involved.
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the setting of ranking problem and scoring methods. Section 3 defines self-consistency and (strong) order preservation besides some other properties. Section 4 proves that one type of scoring methods cannot be self-consistent. Section 5 addresses the compatibility of the axioms, and derives a negative result. Section 6 strengthens this finding by opposing self-consistency and order preservation. Section 7 summarizes our main findings.
The ranking problem and scoring methods
Consider a set of players N = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n }, n ∈ N + and a series of tournament matrices T
(1) , T (2) , . . . , T (m) containing information on the paired comparisons of the players. Their entries are given such that t (p) ij + t (p) ji = 1 if players X i and X j have played in round p (1 ≤ p ≤ m) and 0 otherwise. The simplest definition can be t (p) ij = 1 if player X i has defeated player X j and t (p) ij = 0 if player X i has lost against player X j in round p. A draw can be represented by t (p) ij = 0.5. The entries may reflect the scores of the players, or other features of the match (e.g. an overtime win has less value than a normal time win), too.
The tuple N,
, denoted shortly by (N, T), is called a general ranking problem. The set of general ranking problems with n players (|N| = n) is denoted by
combines the results of all rounds of the competition. a ij /(a ij + a ji ) can be interpreted as the likelihood that player X i is better than player X j , provided they have been compared, that is, a ij +a ji > 0.
The pair (N, A) is called a ranking problem. The set of ranking problems with n
′ ) ∈ R n be two ranking problems with the same player set N. The sum of these ranking problems is (N, A + A ′ ) ∈ R n . For example, the ranking problems can contain the results of matches in the first and second half of the season, respectively. Any ranking problem (N, A) has a skew-symmetric results matrix
m ij is the number of matches between players X i and X j , whose outcome is given by r ij . Matrices R and M also determine the aggregated tournament matrix through A = (R + M)/2, so any ranking problem (N, A) ∈ R n can be denoted analogously by (N, R, M) with the restriction |r ij | ≤ m ij for all X i , X j ∈ N. Despite description with results and matches matrices is not parsimonious, this notation will turn out to be useful.
A general scoring method is a function g : T n → R n . Several procedures have been suggested in the literature, see Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) for an overview of them. A special type of general scoring methods is the following. Definition 2.1. Individual scoring method (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1999) 
A scoring method is a function f : R n → R n . Any scoring method can also be regarded as a general scoring method -by using the aggregated tournament matrix instead of the whole series of tournament matrices -, therefore some articles only consider scoring methods (Kitti, 2016; Slutzki and Volij, 2005) . González-Díaz et al. (2014) give a thorough axiomatic analysis of certain scoring methods.
In other words, scoring methods first aggregate the tournament matrices and then rank the players by their scores, while individual scoring methods first give scores to the players in each round and then aggregate them.
Axioms of rankings in generalized tournaments
In this section, some properties of (general) scoring methods are presented.
Universal invariance axioms
Axiom 3.1. Anonymity (ANO): Let (N, T) ∈ T n be a general ranking problem, σ : {1, 2, . . . , m} → {1, 2, . . . , m} be a permutation on the set of rounds, and σ(N, T) ∈ T n be the ranking problem obtained from (N, T) by permutation σ. General scoring method g :
Anonymity implies that any reindexing of the rounds (tournament matrices) preserves the scores of the players.
Axiom 3.2. Neutrality (NEU): Let (N, T) ∈ T
n be a general ranking problem, σ : N → N be a permutation on the set of players, and (σ(N), T) ∈ T n be the ranking problem obtained from (N, T) by permutation σ. General scoring method g :
Neutrality means that the scores are independent of the labelling of the players.
Self-consistency
Now we want to formulate a further requirement on the ranking of the players by answering the following question: When is player X i undeniably better than player X j ? There are two such plausible cases: (1) if player X i has achieved better results against the same opponents; (2) if player X i has achieved the same results against stronger opponents. Consequently, player X i should also be judged better if it has achieved better results against stronger opponents than player X j . Furthermore, since (general) scoring methods allow for ties in the ranking, player X i should have the same rank as player X j if it has achieved the same results against opponents with the same strength.
In order to apply these principles, both the results and strengths of the players should be measured. Results can be extracted from the tournament matrices T (p) . Strengths of the players can be determined by the scores according to the (general) scoring method used, hence the name of the implied axiom is self-consistency. It has been introduced in Chebotarev and Shamis (1997) , and extensively discussed by Csató (2017b) .
Multiset is a generalization of the concept of set allowing for multiple instances of the its elements. Notation 3.1. Consider the ranking problem (N, T (p) ) ∈ T n given by restricting a general ranking problem to its pth round. Let X i , X j ∈ N be two different objects and
be a one-to-one correspondence between the opponents of X i and
Axiom 3.3. Self-consistency (SC) (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1997) : Let (N, T) ∈ T n be a general ranking problem. Let X i , X j ∈ N be two players and g : T n → R n be a general scoring method such that for all p = 1, 2, . . . , m there exists a one-to-one mapping
if at least one of the above inequalities is strict.
We think anonymity, neutrality and self-consistency are natural properties of (general) scoring methods, and their violation requires serious justification.
It will turn out that they cannot be met at the same time by any individual scoring method, therefore we will focus on scoring methods in the following and define some axioms for them.
Invariance with respect to the results matrix
Let O ∈ R n×n be the matrix with all of its entries being zero.
According to symmetry, if all paired comparisons (but not necessarily all matches in each round) between the players result in a draw, then all players will have the same score.
Axiom 3.5. Inversion (INV ) (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998) 
Inversion means that taking the opposite of all results changes the ranking accordingly. It establishes a uniform treatment of victories and losses.
The following result has been already mentioned by González-Díaz et al. (2014, p. 150) .
Corollary 3.2. INV implies SY M.
It seems to be difficult to argue against symmetry. However, scoring methods based on eigenvectors usually violate inversion.
Independence
The next property deals with the effects of certain changes in the aggregated tournament matrix A. Axiom 3.6. Independence of irrelevant matches (IIM) (González-Díaz et al., 2014) : Let (N, A), (N, A ′ ) ∈ R n be two ranking problems and X i , X j , X k , X ℓ ∈ N be four different players such that (N, A) and (N, A ′ ) are identical but a kℓ = a
IIM means that 'remote' matches -not involving players X i and X j -do not affect the pairwise ranking of players X i and X j .
Remark 3.1. Property IIM has a meaning if n ≥ 4.
Sequential application of IIM can lead to any ranking problem (N,Ā) ∈ R n wherē 
Additivity
The rounds of a given tournament can be grouped arbitrarily. Therefore, the following property makes much sense. 
OP is a relatively restricted version of additivity, which implies that if player X i is not worse than player X j on the basis of some rounds as well as on the basis of another set of rounds such that all players have played in each round (so they have played the same number of matches altogether), then this pairwise ranking should hold after the two distinct set of rounds are considered jointly.
One can consider a stronger version of order preservation, too. 
In contrast to order preservation, SOP does not contain any restriction on the number of matches of the players in the ranking problems aggregated.
Corollary 3.3. SOP implies OP .
It will turn out that the weaker property, order preservation has still some unfavourable implications.
Individual scoring methods and self-consistency
In this section, it will be proved that meaningful individual scoring methods cannot satisfy self-consistency, which is a natural requirement in sport, thus it is enough to focus on ranking problems and scoring methods. For this purpose, we need the following example. 
Example 4.1. Let N, T
(1) , T (2) ∈ T 4 be a general ranking problem describing a tournament with two rounds.
It is shown in Figure 1 : a directed edge from node X i to X j indicates a win of player X i over X j (and a loss of X j against X i ), while an undirected edge from node X i to X j represents a drawn match between the two players. This representation will be used in further examples, too.
So, player X 1 has defeated X 4 in the first round (Figure 1 .a), while players X 2 and X 3 has played no match. In the second round, players X 1 and X 2 as well as players X 3 and X 4 have drawn (Figure 1.b) . The whole tournament is shown on Figure 1 .c.
In Section 3, three axioms, ANO, NEU and SC have been introduced for general ranking problems. The following result shows that at least one of them will be violated by any individual scoring method.
Proposition 4.1. There exists no anonymous and neutral individual scoring method satisfies self-consistency in the case of incomplete tournament rounds.
Proof. Let g : T n → R n be an anonymous and neutral individual scoring method. Consider Example 4.1. ANO and NEU imply that g 2 (N, T
(1) ) = g 3 (N, T (1) ) and g 2 (N,
Note that O
4 = {X 3 }. Take the one-toone correspondences h 41 . Suppose that g 1 (N, T) ≤ g 4 (N, T). Then players X 1 and X 4 has a draw against a player with the same strength (X 2 and X 3 , respectively), but X 1 has defeated X 4 , so it has a better result against a not weaker opponent. Therefore, self-consistency (Axiom 3.3) implies g 1 (N, T) > g 4 (N, T), which is a contradiction, thus g 1 (N, T) > g 4 (N, T) holds.
However, O
(1) 2 34 (the two draws should be represented by the same number) and g 1 (N, T) > g 4 (N, T) -leads to g 2 (N, T) > g 3 (N, T) because player X 2 has achieved the same result against a stronger opponent than player X 3 . In other words, SC requires the draw of X 2 to be more valuable than the draw of X 3 , but it cannot be reflected by the individual scoring method g according to (1).
Proposition 4.1 verifies that only the procedure underlying scoring methods can be compatible with self-consistency, the order of aggregating the tournament matrices and deriving the scores is not reversible.
Some connections among the axioms
On the basis of Proposition 4.1, we will focus on ranking problems and scoring methods in the following, which allows for the discussion of axioms defined on this domain: symmetry, inversion, independence of irrelevant matches, and (strong) order preservation. There are some links between them. 
Proof. Consider a ranking problem (N, R, M)
It turns out that IIM is also closely linked to SOP .
Proposition 5.1. A scoring method satisfying NEU, SY M and SOP meets IIM.
Proof. Assume to the contrary, and let (N, R, M) ∈ R n be a ranking problem, f : R n → R n be a scoring method satisfying NEU, SY M and SOP , and 
′′ , M ′′ ) from strong order preservation, which is a contradiction.
It remains to be seen whether NEU, SY M and SOP are all necessary in Proposition 5.1.
Lemma 5.2. NEU, SY M and SOP are logically independent axioms with respect to the implication of IIM.
Proof. It is shown that there exist scoring methods, which satisfy exactly two properties from the set NEU, SY M and SOP , but violate the third and does not meet IIM, too: Proposition 5.1 helps to derive another impossibility statement.
Proposition 5.2. There exists no scoring method that satisfies neutrality, symmetry, strong order preservation and self-consistency.
Proof. According to Proposition 5.1, NEU, SY M and SOP imply IIM. Csató (2017b, Theorem 3.1) has shown that IIM and SC cannot be met at the same time.
A basic impossibility result
Lemma 5.2 suggests that the four axioms of Proposition 5.2 may be independent. It is not the case, leading to a much stronger statement, which also allows for the weakening of strong order preservation with order preservation. Note that substituting an axiom with a weaker one in an impossibility statement leads to a stronger result. We will use a generalized tournament with four players.
Figure 2: Ranking problems of Example 6.1
be two ranking problems. They are shown in Figure 2 : in the first tournament described by (N, R, M) , matches between players X 1 and X 2 , X 1 and X 4 , X 2 and X 3 , X 3 and X 4 are all resulted in draws (see Figure 2 .a). On the other side, in the second tournament, described by (N, R ′ , M ′ ), players X 1 and X 2 have lost against X 3 and drawn against X 4 (see Figure 2 .b). The two ranking problems can be summed in (N, Figure 2 .c).
Theorem 6.1. There exists no scoring method that satisfies order preservation and selfconsistency.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a self-consistent scoring method f : R n → R n satisfying order preservation. Consider Example 6.1.
I. Take the ranking problem (N, R, M) .
a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h 13 : O 1 ↔ O 3 and h 31 :
Since r 12 = r 32 = 0 and r 14 = r 34 = 0, players X 1 and X 3 have the same results against the same opponents, hence R, M) . Consider the one-to-one mapping h 12 : O 1 ↔ O 2 , where h 12 (X 2 ) = X 1 and h 12 (X 4 ) = X 3 . Since r 12 = r 21 = 0 and r 14 = r 23 = 0, player X 1 has the same results against stronger opponents compared to
Hence, self-consistency leads to R, M) in the first ranking problem.
II. Take the ranking problem (N, R
a) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondences h 
b) Consider the identity one-to-one correspondence h 
III. Take the sum of these two ranking problems, the ranking problem (N, R ′′ , M ′′ ).
. Consider the one-to-one mappings 
To summarize, self-consistency leads to
, respectively, which is impossible.
Therefore, it has been derived that no scoring method can meet OP and SC simultaneously on the universal domain of R n .
Theorem 6.1 is a serious negative result: by accepting self-consistency, one cannot require the ranking method to be additive in the case of ranking problems where all players have played the same number of matches. 
Example 6.2. Let (N, R, M) ∈ R 4 be the ranking problem in Figure 3 : X 1 has drawn against X 2 , X 2 against X 3 and X 3 against X 4 .
The comparison of Proposition 5.2 and Theorem 6.1 suggests that self-consistency may imply neutrality or symmetry. However, it is not true as the following lemma shows. (N, R, M) , for example, player X i gets the score 4 − i. f meets selfconsistency since X 1 has the same result against a stronger opponent compared to X 4 , while there exists no correspondence between opponent sets O 2 and O 3 satisfying the conditions of SC.
Let σ : N → N be a permutation such that σ(X 1 ) = X 4 , σ(X 2 ) = X 3 , σ(X 3 ) = X 2 , and σ( (N, R, M) , another impossibility. Therefore there exists a self-consistent scoring method, which is not neutral and symmetric.
Conclusions
We have found some unexpected implications of different properties in the case of generalized tournaments where the players should be ranked on the basis of match results against each other. First, self-consistency prohibits the use of individual scoring methods, that is, scores cannot be derived before the aggregation of tournament rounds (Proposition 4.1). Second, independence of irrelevant matches (posing a kind of independence concerning the pairwise ranking of two players) follows from three axioms, neutrality (independence of relabelling the players), symmetry (implying a flat ranking if all aggregated comparisons are draws), and strong order preservation (perhaps the most natural property of additivity). According to Csató (2017b) , there exists no scoring method satisfying self-consistency and independence of irrelevant matches, hence Proposition 5.1 implies that neutrality, symmetry, strong order preservation and self-consistency cannot be met simultaneously (Proposition 5.2). Furthermore, it turns out that self-consistency and a weaker version of strong order preservation are still enough to derive this negative result (Theorem 6.1), and one should choose between these two natural requirements.
What our results say to practitioners who want to rank players or teams as fairly as possible? First, self-consistency does not allow to rank them in individual rounds, one has to wait until all tournament results are known and can be aggregated. Second, self-consistency is not compatible with order preservation on this universal domain. It is not an unexpected and counter-intuitive result since González-Díaz et al. (2014) have shown that several ranking methods violate order preservation, but we have proved that there is no hope to find a reasonable scoring method with this property. From an abstract point of view, breaking of order preservation in tournament ranking is a version of Simpson's paradox, a phenomenon in probability and statistics, in which a trend appears in different groups of data but disappears or reverses when these groups are combined.
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This holds despite self-consistency is somewhat weaker than our intuition suggests: it does not imply neutrality and symmetry, so even a self-consistent ranking of players may depend on their names and without ties if all matches are drawn (Lemma 6.1). Third, losing the simplicity provided by order preservation certainly does not facilitate the axiomatic construction of scoring methods.
Consequently, while sacrificing order preservation seems to be unavoidable in this general setting, an obvious continuation of the current research is to get positive possibility results by some domain restrictions or further weakening of the axioms. It is also worth to note that the incompatibility of self-consistency and order preservation does not imply that any scoring method is always going to work badly, but all can work badly at times.
